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These two fundamental assumptions are in conflict with each other especially about the
result they have in and for an armored world. I will present a brief account of the terms of this
conflict as seen from the side of the "spiri t-soul" assumption and in the light of a few of its
concepts and other secondary assumptions:
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The present essay contains an outline of an attempt to compre-
hend life from within. For this purpose the author isolates three
fundamental conditions of life in general: elegance, in-elegance,
and slovenliness. The phenomenological essences of II interiority,"
u emptiness, II and" pure negativity" are uncovered and used to
interpret the epistemological basis of todcy's practical and theo-
retical life as well as the present crisis of knowledge and meaning.
Armor is a defensive equipment worn as a protection against offensive weaponry. In
addition, armor constricts the movements of the wearer, it is a protection against other armors, it
is used in war or tournament, and the inside is concealed from sight. Let us say that such armors
are found in a world which they shape and mcster: they are and consider themselves to be superior
to every other thing in their world. In this armored world there are two fundamental assumptions
about the never seen inside of the armors. One assumption is that the inside is either nothing or
is a substance, a thing called the II thing-soul. II The other assumption, although it accepts the
idea of a soul, is that it is not a substance, not a thing, but an ethereal spirit. Since it is not a
thing, it has, among other attributes, those of indivisibility and indestructibility. The former
assumption also posits indivisibility and indestructibility, but in its "scientificl'mode does not need
to take these attributes into account. The second assumption, then, is that the inside of the armors
is a "spir it-soui , II
U __ Our world is an armory, it is armorified. Q.Jr "spirl t-soul" assumption is the basic
truth that reveals the condition of the world. We are concerned with this condition and what it
does to the spirit-souls. In our armored world there are armors whose condition is such that they
are called "sick, II meaning "useless," tldangerous,lI "weird,1I or "disordered." This "sickness"
does not refer to the external deterioration of the armors but to a condition of their movement,
their behavior. The imputation of "sickness," based on movements which are recorded as l\\ei rd,lI
"incomprehensib le , II "dcnqerous, J' etc., is unfounded and should be carefully studied for it may
reveal something about the armored world itself that produces this "sickness. II The first thing we
mairtain then is that the present condition of our world is not only an armored world, but that in
such a world armors are bound to collide constantly and inexorably. In such a situation some
armors become trapped, immobil ized, para Iyzed; others enter into a totally disordered coli ision
and move from place to place bouncing like unpredictable balls and hitting every other armor
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unexpectedly, and a third group simply drop out of this world to avoid collisions.
"The armored world has many "labels" for such behaviors. Among some of them we find:
crimi nal behavior, mental i IIness, schizophrenia, deviant behavior, mental disorder, etc. Such a
world has places to confine armors exhibiting such behaviors and other armors dedicated to their
repair. For these practices, and for the interpretation of the whole armored world, the competing
assumption of the "rhinq-soul" is used. We do not uphold such an assumption and we abstain from
using their interpretation; we must either suspend iudgment on the conclusions of those interpre-
tations or we must apply our own assumption in order to reveal this suffering condition in the
armored world.
liThe first working assumption is, then, that in such an armored world armors collide and
get into irresoluble contradictions ca lied II double binds, II "no-win-qomes, II .. impasses, J' etc. In
our world this appears to corroborate the label of "sickness" imposed on those unfortunate armors,
that it is the "sick thing-soul" that animates (from the Latin anima meaning soul) the armors in an
unpredictable, weird, dangerous, and disordered manner manifested in their movement or behavior.
This "lobe l inq" of the" thinq-soul" as "sick" must be questioned although the" lcbelinq" is a fact.
It is possible that the soul be only a victim, locked inside its colliding armor from which it could
be rescued. Those who blame the soul, who call it "sick" do not realize that they derive this
from their assumption positing the soul as a thing. But we maintain that the soul is not a thing, but
an indestructible, spiritual unity; it is basically holy and as such should not be blamed. The
armors and their colliding condition in an armory world must instead be blamed. Whoever attacks
the soul or thinks it is a "sick thing" is inadvertently defending the maintenance of the world as an
armored world. Similarly, whoever takes as his [ob the repairing of armors with a "sick soul" under
the assumption of a "sick thinq-sou!' is only attempting to fix the armor in order that it can con-
tinue to exist in an armored world. In other words, the "thinq-sou!" does not change the armor,
eliminate it or abolish the situation of an armory world in inexorable collision.
"Insteod of this we should penetrate the so-called "sick" soul, for its alleged condition
of "sickness" is not a condition of unblessedness, or unsoulness; the soul is only a victim. This
"spiri t-soul" suffers in its confinement inside a colliding, bumpbed, and wrecked armor, but
whose wrecked and bumped appearance has not wrecked the soul inside which is an indestructible
and pure spiritual unity. Whoever lets himself be deluded by the appearances of the condition
and movements of the armor is a "lcbeler, II and our armored world in unfortunately dominated by
labelers who "label II the soul after the appearances of the crmor's behovior, and who proceed to
either dump it in the [unk yard or send it to the repair shop where the armor is treated as a "sick"
"thinq-sou!" which incorporated again as an armor into an armored world. These repairers have a
sophisticated correspondence theory of truth which posits a correspondence between the l'thing-
soul" and the armor that it animates. It only arranges the elements of the "thing-soul ll so that
they correspond to already pre-established labels about the behavior of the armors. It is nothing
but a defense of the "lcbe] ios" process in the armored world.
"We then maintain that the soul which is labeled "sickle is not so. We accept that those
so labeled behave in peculiar ways, but the "sickness" of their souls must be questioned. First,
how can a spiritual, non-thing which is an indestructible unity be "sick"? "lnfirm" would be a
better word, i.e., "in-firm, JI meaning not firm because of being tired or doubtful about armored
confinement in an armored world. Such a soul is a victim sacrificed by its condition in an
armored world. Victima always meant II for sacrifice. II
j
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IINow, if the soul only appears to be "sick, II we should both criticize those who adhere
in praxis to the correspondence theory and, in opposition to it, we should positively seek to know,
to penetrate, to communicate with the allegedly "sick" soul which in its lamentable condition may
have something of extraordinary importance to say. From our inspection of a world of armors in
collision and from our intuition that the soul is a unity which cannot be wrecked or dismembered,
because it has no members nor parts, a soul which can only afflicted, infirmed and victimized, we
may be able to criticise the system of armors/ point to their inevitable collision within this system
and, at the same time, call for a more" humane" treatment of armors.
"Our insight now calls for a change of the repair shops, the armorers, and the theories on
which they base their practices. Only those armors which are damaged beyond immediate repair
(meaning those souls which are too inform and afflicted) or those which are in obvious dangerous
and aim less paths may be confi ned. But the other allegedly "sick" armors should meanwhi Ie be
treated humanly, i.e., as spirit-souls enclosed in an armor. Our most radical phase calls for the
elimination of armors in order to leave the souls in their nakedness, free from their constraining
armors. This requires that we point out and demonstrate to the armored world that it can be
changed; that the armored condition can be abolished; that there are only armors in appearance;
that it is an illusion become reality but still an illusion; that there are only souls, pure and
spiritual souls; and that these souls see the world as one of armors, iron hard, unchangeable and
indestructible. Those souls are armorified, i.e., reified. No wonder their theories postulate
the soul as a thing, as a substantial entity in correspondence with another substantial entity: the
armor which wears them.
"Our theory is critical of the establishment of armoredness, and instead of condemning
armors as "sick thing-souls, It we seek help from the allegedly" sick souls" themselves. These
souls are not "sick/" they are only afflicted and in-firm by being hosted inside armors in an
armory world. Their affliction may be a great asset for their own help as well as for our criticism
of the conditions that victimize them. Our familiarity with recent philosophy suggests that the
afflicted soul may have come itself to suspend the interpretation of the world held in the armory
world and reflectively notice that if the world is an armory in perpetual collision, the soul may
have decided to break away from this assumptive world. It may also know that breaking these
assumptions means further affliction, but in the process, although allegedly "sick" from the point
of view of the armored establishment, this "deviant, II in the depth of its indivisible spiritual soul,
this afflicted consciousness may know a lot and our approach may benefit greatly from it. This
soul does not care for the armored world and can present itself to us, although afflicted, in its
nakedness. The structure of this pure and naked spirit, this consciousness, may reveal the secrets
for overcoming the armored establishment' and consequently for its own cure.
"Our basic position, to repeat, is that the soul is not a thing in correspondence with the
armor hosting it, that it is an error to treat the" thing-soul" as animating the armor, and that
therefore it is not a wrecked thing-soul. The soul is of a spiritual ncture, one and indivisible;
it can become afflicted by both being forced to dwell within an armor and in an armored world.
This affliction cannot be alleviated, much less cured, by attempting to fix the thing-soul in the
expectation that it would result in the normalization of its crrnor 's behavior. This, we hold, would
would only maintain souls within their armors in an armored world with its inexorable condition
of forced collision. It is, therefore, the armors themselves and their colliding armored world
that must be radically abolished. We must have souls, not armors and armored worlds. The theory
of the armored world is conservative and its conservatism derives from the correspondence theory
of truth between" thing-souls" and armors. This theory sees only armors, although it does not
know it, for in its armorified, a reified condition of science; it deals with armors through
l'reified concepts" such as "thinq-souls , - - II
The two conflicting theories presented above from the point of view of the theory I called
the "thinq-soul theory" have their philosophical ground in western rationalism, i.e., they are
based on the last remains of the phi losophy that characterized W'astern thought si nce Descartes.
The "rhi ng-soul theory" is grounded on Cartesian rationa I ideal ism. The II spi rit-soul theory" is
spiritualized Cartesianism; the ego, the soul, the pure consciousness is desubstantialized. It is
even grounded on a more radically idealist rationalism then that of Descartes or Kant. It is
tinted by a disguised materialism and existentialist irrationalism. This is not the place for a
detailed examination of the philosophical containers of these theories. I will limit myself, then/
to briefly surveying their dependence on a primitive conception of man from which they have not
been able to detach themselves.
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This primitive conception assumes that man is composed of two parts: body and soul; two
hostile and different worlds/ incompatible and 'irreconcilable. The pure/ immortal soul is counter-
posed to the impure/ corruptible and perishable body. The deplorable condition of man as the
union of these two contrasting elements was due to a punishment. This is the fall of man/ the
original sin. The body then came to be conceived as the [ci l, the tomb/ in other words, the armor
encapsulating the soul. If the soul was pure and only became incarcerated in its armor by the fall,
then its true life would be interpreted as that of the soul itself. The body/ the armor/ had to be
accepted as the sign of the punishment. This conception was central to both Christianity and
Western phi losophy.
In Puritanism/ the relative condition or shape of the armor was an indication of the health
or sickness of the soul/ the signs of its predestination. In this way, thought and conduct came to
be considered as the products of original sin (or predestination), i.e., of the relative health or
sickness of the soul. Philosophy substantialized the soul, i.e./ the soul becomes a substance/ a
thing (Descartes) and the "crmored thinq-soul" conception pervades the philosophical thought of
the West unti I the last quarter of the XIX century. The thing-soul becomes the regulatory center
of the external world; reason is the desirable condition of the soul's health and and successful
control of the world its guarantee.
It is the distrust of the II thing-soul ll assumption itself and of its consequences for the world
which has for the last century brought the whole of W(~stern phi losophy into question. Some of the
least happy questionings have taken the form of the rejectionof the external world as incompre-
hensible/ oppressing/ out of control, soulless/ hostile and nauseating (Sartre). The revolt against
the alleged results of the II thinq-soul" conception has become a rebellion against reason in
genera I. Irrational ism was the outcome of this rebell ion. Elements of this irrational ism have
pervaded the doctrines of Dostoyevski, Kafka, Kierkeqcord, Scrtre , and partially those of
Nietzsche and Unamuno. In its most radical exponents/ irrationalism represents a purely negative
insubordination declaring the world "absurd" (Camus), nauseating, and a hopeless failure. As
a consequence, everything becomes devalued: life/ language/ society/ reason, comfort/ custom,
communication/ consumption, etc. The pure ego, pure consciousness/ lnrersubjecfivl ty , the
individual/ the pure II for itself;" the "spirif-soul" becomes again a prominent reality. In its
revolutionary new form it represents a return to the primitive conception of man minus the
religious interpretation. The" thi nq-soul" conception is condemned as a "reified ll abstraction
and the "spir i t-sou!" is defended against its inhuman, oppressive, absurd, and nauseating external
wor Id. It becomes the "orrnored spi rit-soul" concepti on of the world. The contemplative faction
of this view advocates a renunciation of the world as corrupt, meaningless, impure, irrational,
absurd, as a deplorable [cl I and tomb of the spirit-soul. Another faction wants to attack and
destroy the external armor and defends the spirit-soul against all labels of "sickness."
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These forms of thought and action are erroneous interpretations of the most serious phi 10-
sophical achievements of Western thought. They are precisely what contemporary philosophy
strove to overcome -- the nihi list tendencies of Western rationalism as grounded in the primitive
conception of man sketched above. It is as if these factions had singled out the exposition of the
nihilist tendencies (articulated by philosophy in order to be overcome) and made them their own.
II
Phenomenolgy, as the description of pure essences, is the possibility of philosophy, not a
philosophy itself. This is clear for at least three philosophers who in my iudgment have under-
stood Husserl properly: Ortega y Gasset, Heidegger and Jul ian Marias. Thus, Husserls phenom-
ology was according to Ortega, "no ... una filosofia: fue ... una buena suerte ll (Ortega
(Ortega y Gasset, 1960:411). According to Heidegger: IfIPhenomenologyl means:
oC--rro,sc(:C)',.s.~( 'T'tJC ¢ ~I..YO~€l'.c (apophainesthai ta pheinomena): to let that
which shows itself be seen in the very way in which it shows itself from itself" (Heidegger, 1951:
40 and 1962:58). The great contribution of Husserl then has to be understood in its historical
context. Husser l's phenomenology was the formulation of the possibi lity of phi losophy at the end
of a period of phi losophical darkness, the dark ages of positivism, which preceeded Husserl. This
is why it is incomprehensible how Husser ls phenomenology is sometimes confused with unphiloso-
phical positivism. The cry of phenomenology: Zu den Sachen SeJbstl: to the things themselves!
remains either confusing for many admirers of phenomenology or is taken as the motto of Husse rl ls
radical positivism. If we want to call it positivism we should at least keep in mind that it is
radically different from what has come to be known as positivism.
After this preparatory introduction I would like to move to what is the main concern in this
essay: the phenomenologica I exegesis of elegance. What is elegance? In common everyday
language and in reference to clothes or dress weaving, for example, we could say: elegance is
a manner of dressing, of wearing one1s clothes in such a way that we wear our clothes rather than
be worn by them. This common description of elegance does not contain yet everything we need
for a phenomenological exegesis of e leqcnce; its essence is sti If concealed. The example of
dressing, wi I, be used as the scenario, in the sense of stage, to faci litate my exegesis. My
attempt at a phenomenological exegesis of elegance must be understood in the most general sense.
The reader is reminded that without a background or a stage, description becomes very difficult
and that the phenomenological .description of essences becomes easier if a concrete example is
used. I should also make clear that I am not concerned here with a critico-theoretical analysis.
Criticism is only possible between two theoretical perspectives whose antagonism is reflected in
criticism. Whatever criticism is involved in the present exegesis is only secondary and deri-
vative.
What is elegance then? The English language has several words to refer to elegance or
to an elegant person. The most usual synonyms are: refinement, clarity, purity, ease, grace or
gracefulness, polish, finish, propriety or appropriateness, good taste, harmony, simplicity,
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rhythm, symmetry, (good) style, euphony, classicism, purism, discriminative, correctness,
artistic, fluent, mellifluous, balanced, neat, well-expressed, etc. Of most of these words there
are a few which I will single out for the exegesis of elegance; these are ll (clarity), ease and grace,
propriety, harmony or balance, (euphony), artistic, (fluent), (attractiveness), and well (expressed).
I have put in parantheses those words which wi II be of most importance later. Using the example
of dress we can say that that manner of wearing our clothes rather than being worn by them is
what we mean by ease, grace, and even attractiveness. W'd are still far from understanding what
elegance is; its essence is still concealed. Let us examine another situation.
When something or somebody appears to us in such a way that it or he elicits from us the
words graceless, vu·lgar, common, harsh, abrupt, dry, stiff, cramped, forced, labored, artificial,
mannered, ponderous, turgid, affected, crude, full, foring, what do we mean? w\c~ are saying
that something is lacking. W'd see things, we see persons wearing clothes, using objects,
surrounded by objects, but we get a strange feeling of coldness, of incompleteness; we are over-
whelmed by the presence of things but we feel that something is missing, that when we look we
sense this lack but we do not necessari Iy know or understand what is lacking, what should be
there. W'a usually tend to think that it lacks grace, manners, attractiveness; that it should not
be harsh, stiff, cramped, forced, affected, dull, etc. We may even say that it lacks elegance
and that what is missing is something we call elegance; we say, then that we are in the presence
of somebody who is "i n-e leqcnt , II In the example of dressing we would perhaps notice that the
clothes are wearing the" in-elegant" person. In any case, what we may think to be missing is not
urderstood; we only perceive a "lack of" something and it gives us a mysterious feeling of coldness
ord irritability. (The phenomenological exegesis of irritability is connected to the present exegesis
of elegarce, but I wi II not be concerned with it directly in this essay.) This phenomenological
perception of what is missing, the "leek of" is a negative perception. It is like "looking" at a box
open on one end and feeling uneasy because it should be fi lied with something and yet we do not
know what this IIsomething-· is. W'd only know that it is not in the box.
So far, we can say that in elegance something is present and in in-elegance something is
missing. In the first case, we feel the presence of something which is still concealed and which
we do rot yet understand in the phenomenological sense. In the case of in-elegance, on the other
hand, we perceive negatively, i.e., we perceive the "leek of" which a Iways demands completion.
In both cases, the only thing that presents itself before us, in the physical sense of presence, are
objects, dresses, possessions, things and their shapes, colors, their arrangement, and movement,
etc. The objects can be the same in both cases. For example, an elegant person may wear the
same dress as an in-elegant person and yet we would be able, in most cases, to say that one is
elegant and the other in-elegant. If we are perceptive we can say that the elegant "knows how
to wear the dress" and the in-elegant "does not" or is "worn by the dress. II In other words,
elegance is not uniquely determined by objects , The common belief that the elegant is surrounded
by specia I objects, expensive, choice, and unique is only a delusion, an optical illusion. We
will later understand why this suggests an important point that I would like to emphasize at this
point: elegance or in-elegance is not uniquely determined by obiects although obiects are
indispensable in each case. I would like to reemphasize that obiects are indispensable.
Objects then are unimportant although indispensable. If objects do not uniquely deter-
mine elegance or in-elegance but they are indispensable, this means that objects do not say
anything, they are silent, mute. Dilthey said that nature is silent and inexpressive and that for
this reason Nature is "explo ined": only life is understood. What does this muteness, this silence
The characteristics of in-elegance are, as a mode of being, first, that objects are both
indispensable and important; second, that objects remain inexorably opaque, they are unavoid-
able, they impose themselves on us, catch the attention and fixate themselves as independent
and as if speaking for themselves; and thirdly, that in in-elegance "somethinq" is missing: the
I have so for then presented general characteristics of elegance. First, that for elegance,
as a mode of being, objects are indispensable but unimportant; second that objects are given the
possibi Iity of being transparent, unnoticed, i. e., the possibi Iity of bei ng indifferent towards them,
of being ignored, and thirdly, that in elegance "something" is present which is not occluded by
the object themselves. This "something" is the essence of elegance and I will call it
"interioriry ," What "e leqonr see inq" sees in elegance is "interiority. It The elucidation of the
structure of this essence wi IJ not be treated in this essay.
of objects mean? It means that by themselves they do not express anything. Contrary to what
contemporary empiricists believe, objects do not speak for themselves. Now, the unimportance
of objects should allow us to grasp something crucial about elegance and in-elegance. Elegance
is characterized by the transparency of the indispensable objects whereas in-elegance is charac-
terized by the opaqueness of objec ts , Said in a different way: elegance ignores or is indifferent
to the indispensable objects whereas in-elegance concentrates or sees only objects. For more
generality I will emphasize that by object here I mean anything which is perceived by the senses,
whether a static obiect, 0 motion, a gesture, a role, or a behavior. Using again the example of
dressing I can say that a symptom of elegance is manifest when we wear our clothes in such a way
that we are not aware of them, i. e., that we wear them as if they were not there. W'3 ignore or
are indifferent to them. The elegant mother will tell her daughter, "Put your dress on and then
forget it ." On the other hand, in-elegant dressing wi II be manifest when the clothes catch our
attention, when we are "conscious" of them, when they are visible and we are subject to them,
i.e., when they wear us. We behave in such a manner that we allow the clothes to determine
our movements and to catch our attention.
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What is, then, elegance, or better, what is the essence (in the phenomenological sense)
of elegance? Before I present this essence I have to clarify that elegance is both "0 see inq" and
Ita being" in the active sense. The some applies for in-elegance. Thus, lIelegant seeing" (in the
phenomenological sense of "seeing" "looks" through objects, objects become transparent or
ignored in this "seeing. II When elegance "looks" and cannot get beyond the objects, i.e., the
objects are inevitably visible (in the physical sense), when the objects are so interposed that they
cannot be ignored, when they remain opaque, when they stubbornly resist "elegant seeing ll as if
insisting that they should speak for themselves; then elegance "sees" in-elegance. As a mode of
'be inq, II elegance is a condition in which objects are given the possibility of being transparent,
ignored, that is, the possibi lity of indifference towards them. On the other hand, '''n-elega'nt
seeing" sees only objects. Objects are inexorably opaque and empirically visible. As a
consequence, objects become dictatorial for in-elegant seeing, they present themselves and
demand that they should speak for themselves. Thus, "in-e leqcnt seeing" is "object seeing," it
is pure empiricism. "ln-e leqonr seeing" can never understand elegance, i .a., it can never
phenomenologically perceive elegance, or better, the essence of elegance. It only sees objects.
Such seeing would therefore consider it elegant, for example, to wear expensive clothes, to have
expensive things or possessions, etc. IIln-elegant seeing" is phenomenologically blind. Similarly,
"in -e leqont beinq" is a condition in which objects have no possibility of becoming transparent,
of being ignored, of becoming indifferent.
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on\y th\og there is a "leek of. II Since what is missing is not in in-elegance, this "lack of, II which
I will call lIemptiness,lI is the essence of in~elegance. What"in-elegant seeing" see~ everywhere
is "exteriority ." It only sees objec ts ,
There is crossing of terms here which I feel should be clarified. W!lat "e leqont seeing"
sees in elegance is its essence, "inter iori ty , II and in in-elegance it sees "ernptiness , II i. e., the
"lock of" interiority. On the other hand, "in-elegant see inq" sees "exteriority;" i.e., the objects
themselves both in elegance and in in-elegance; in fact we could say that in-elegance can never
Useell elegance. If we want to accentuate this description we could say that elegance is all
"interiority" whereas in-eleqcnce is all "exteriortry. II
Furthermore, since for elegance objects are indispensable, although not important, we
could say that elegance is "completeness" whereas in-elegance is "incompleteness." We sometimes
hear the expressions "finished,1I "balanced, II "polished" to refer to elegant appearance in dress
and in conduct. The reference to "completeness;" in the phenomenological sense, is implicit.
The opposite words are similarly used to refer to in-elegance and implicitly contain the meaning
of "incompleteness , II We also hear the words "shc llow'' and "superficial" to refer to in-elegance;
they implicitly contain the meaning of "leek of depth," i.e., superficiality or lack of interiority,
and emptiness.
The phenomenological exergesis of elegance and in-elegance is not complete yet.
Elegance comes from elegire, Latin for lito elect, II lito choose. II What kind of choice? Tentatively
I would say "proper" choice. Proper derives from the Latin propius, meaning "your very own."
Now choice in general demands that something be chosen, let us sayan object. But does the
chosen object uniquely determine elegance as choice? I have shown before that objects themselves
do not determine elegance. What then? Does the act of "choosing" determine elegance? Not at
all. Objects are chosen for the sake of or to convey elegance. In the act of choosing there is
always a subject, choice always impl ies an active subject, Elegant choice must, according to
what I have said so far, have a peculiar characteristic; mainly, it must choose or handle objects
in such a way that the objects become imperceptible. Why? Because the objects themselves are
not the concern of elegance. Objects are for elegance, not elegance itself. It is the exteriori-
zation of "interiori ty" as the essence of elegance that objects serve. Objects then become the
larguage of elegance. But a language serves the purpose of saying something; this something is
"interiority. II "Proper" choice, i.e., "one's very own" choice is actually the manifestation of
one's very own interiority through ob [ects such as language. Elegance, then, is essentially
"rnecninqful" talk about one's interiority. The "objective" world becomes a language to convey
"interiorlty ;" Everything is language, not [ust the spoken and written language, but objects
themselves, clothes, possessions, and things around oneself. This language, whose vocabulary
is composed of objects, all objects, is the language of interiority and must not itself stand
between "interiority" and its destination which is another "interiori ty ;" It must pass unnoticed,
invisible; it must not itself catch our attention. Just as in elegant dressing the clothes cannot
constrai n the wea;;;;=- who must be unaware of them but who chooses (wears) them as if they were
not there, inelegance, generally speaking, all objects become an unnoticeable language.
If the object-Ionqucqe of elegance distracts from what is speaks about it becomes
snobbery and ostentation. Ostentation means precisely to "show off" objects, and objects, I
have said, do not speak for themselves. W'nen objects, then, become the only thing present,
they give the elegant that feeling of "empti ness" which is the essence of the in-elegant, the
ostentatious, and the snob. Since, again, objects do not speak for themselves, in-elegance is
either "si lence " or "meaninglessness. II The in-elegant does not say anything, he does not have
anythi ng to say.
Language, as I have said, is the medium to transmit the essence of elegance which is
"interiority. II This medium must be transparent in order to "see" that which is transmitted or
communicated through it. The physical analogy of this medium is clear air or clear water. A
physical object is seen if the medium is transparent (which ban be another object such as water
or a clean crystal or glass). When the air is foggy or another opaque object is interposed between
us and the first object, the first object remains concealed. In our case, what has to be trans-
mitted is not an cbjec t, on the contrary, objects are the media, which although physically
visible, must be transparent or invisible to allow the transmission of "i nteriority ;" This is related
to what Husserl meant by perception and aperception.
The essence of elegance is, then, "interiority;" and elegance is choice of objects such
that they become a language which in turn must be imperceptible and transparent. Language
must be like a medium through which "interiori ty" is transmitted. The medium must have the
characteristics of "clarity" and "fluency" so that "intetlority" is transmitted "euphoricc lly"
(from the Greek euphonos, well-sounding). Now, all this reveals a further fundamental charac-
teristic of "inter lori ty ." This characteristic is called "expressiveness ," "Expressiveness" is
"interi or ity" manifesting or exteriorizing itself. "Interiority" is not only potentially expressible,
it is only and in so far as it is being expressed. "lnter icri ty" can also be interpreted as the source,
thefountain, the birth place of "creativity. II Or, "creativity" is the act of exteriorizing
"lnteriori ty , II But since "Interior-ity" is only in its being expressed, "interiority," "creativity,1I
and "expressiveness" are inextricably bound together. M,~aningful creativity is then as essence
of elegance which uses the "externcl " world as its language in such a way that the external world
becomes invisible. An analogy may serve here to illustrate this "trcnspcrency" of objects in
elegance.
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I have been saying that for elegance, whose essence is interiority, all objects become the
words of a language and that the words (the objects) must become transparent. This also applies
to the case of our spoken and written language. Speech or writing is meaningful, it conveys
something, only when it is elegant, when it is used to say something rather than to be displayed,
ostentated, or shown off. When language becomes petrified, when its use is careless and rigid,
our attention is caught by the words, and we become distracted by the words themselves. The
words wear the speaker. It is then that we say "it does not make any sense, II "it is meaningless,lI
"rhetorical, II etc. But, what "does not make any sense"? What is "rnecninqless II? The language
itself? Not at all, It is the speaker. He is not telling us anything. The language is only shown
ostento tiously, our attention is caught by the words. However familiar they are to us, words
become like objects when used by the in-elegant. They become petrified, thingified, reified:
they become opaque. They are interposed between the speaker's interiority and the destination
of this interiority, i.e., one or several other interiorities. We only hear words, sounds. They
may be arranged in a grammatically impeccable way but they are, on the whole, silent. Since
they make noise, they irritate us. My seven-year-old daughter once made a perceptive remark.
She said, "Mama, words don't mean anything, do they?" A particular language as a whole, or
the language of a particular group (e. g. sociologists, psychologists, mathematicians, etc.) can
become itself a rigid coat to be worn by and in spite of the richness of its vocabulary.
The reader may think at this point that "interiority" is a metaphysical obscurity or at most
a concept which epistemologically has no more claim to existence than a wave, a positron, or a
graviton have in physics; it is an invention useful to "explui n" phenomena. This interpretation
will confuse scientific thinking with phenomenological understanding of life from within life
ieself. Life, as Ortega y Gasset has aply demonstrated, is the "rcdico l reality" from which we
depart even to make science. I have no time here to present the difference between phenomena
in the scientific sense and phenomena in the phenomenological sense. Let it be enough to say
that the essence "intertori ty'' is phenomena in the phenomenological sense. It is the essence of
elegance. As used in language, it is definitely a concept but a phenomenological concept refer-
ring to a fundamental elerrent of the reality of life.
Interiority, then, is a phenomenological essence; it is the thing itself; it is a fundamental
condition of life. Ortega already noticed that elegance is an essential facet of life where it finds
its secret roots. Interiority is not something statically "contained in" Iife; it exists only insofar as
it is "being expressed. II It must be communicated by language and through language. When
expressed it uses the objec ts around, e.g., dresses, roles, gestures, possessions, etc. When an
exchange of interiorities occurs we say there is com-prehension or co-penetration and the rela-
tionship or communication is said to be "meoninqfu! . II The best example of this is the phenomena
of love and friendship. Love could be said to be the supreme exchange of eJegances. When a
lover II looks" at his or her love, he or she does not truly "see ll the lover's face, hair, eyes, body,
clothes, gestures, roles, etc. Remember that one of the characteristics of elegance is the indif-
ference to the objects and exteriorities which, although indispensable as the media of transmission
of interiorities, as the object-language, become transparent. Thus, in genuine love, lovers do
not '-See" themselves, i.e., their exteriors. Lovers are in a perfect exchange of interiorities.
This is the reason why it is said that "love is blind. II
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Dilthey noticed that life is like an underground current pushing towards the surface. The
internal seeks its manifestation in the external. This manifestation of life Dilthey calls
"expression," I would prefer to say that life is speech. When man talks and does not say anything
he is in-elegant. When he does he is elegant. Elegance then, is saying something about oneself.
This something is what I call ones interiority. The so-called external world becomes a language.
In-elegant man does not say anything, the objects wear him and are expected to speak for them-
selves. Thus, man lives as man only insofar as he can engage in dialogue, or multi logue. For
this he needs objects to be worn, to become a language. As soon as he no longer wears his
clothes, his objects, as soon as these objects become opaque, he becomes in-elegant and the
ob jects are expected to speak for themselves. They come to wear him. Man is then "ernpty . II
To deprive man of his clothes, his roles, his objects , simply because they have come to wear
him, without thinking that naked man is not man, is an absurdity. We have seen before that
words become meaningless when used by the in-elegant because in him they form the exterior,
the only thing to ostentate. But words do not say anything by themselves as objects do not speak
for themselves. This is the reification of language mentioned before. Language becomes a
degeneration of words when used by the in-elegant.
The "seeing" of only roles, things, objects, coats, etc. is a "seeing" of in-elegance by
in-elegance. Only exteriors in collision are seen, as two in-elegant women collide when found
worn by the same dress. Since the essence of in-elegance is "emptiness," in-elegance can only
concentrate on exteriors and talk about exteriors as if these exteriors spoke for themselves. In-
elegance cannot express anything for expressivity is the fundamental condition of "inter iority"
III
which in-elegance lacks. In-elegance then moves in a world of exteriors: it is pure "objectness , II
Just as two in-elegant women talk about clothes, objec ts, or possessions, the in-elegant account
of the world talks about roles, role conflict, social systems, armors, etc. In-elegance "exploins"
but does not understand.
Industrialization and the organization of collective life is not itself a consequence of
in-elegance; only the character which life takes within such worlds is. Industrialization and
organized life may be accomplished equally by in-elegance and elegance. The character of life
will nevertheless be radically different. In the former, life will be a silent and lonely existence
where the individual is a isolated atom (monad) among objects , among exteriors. In the latter,
life will be expressive, communicative, talkative. The objects are the media of expression,
they become the universal language to express interiority.
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The West today is predominately in-elegant. The organization of collective life to the
point of total sacrifice of the individual is almost a commonplace and yet, there is little under-
standing of the situation. The feeling of emptiness said to overtake the modern man remains a
mystery. O/erwhelmed by the immensity of industrial wealth: objects, positions, gadgets, a
sumptuous dress, this interminable exterior baffles us as a monstrous "nothingness. II It leaves us
with a strange feeling; it seduces us to search for a meaning we do not know. The imposing view
of that impressing exteriority, the immensity of objects, the sumptuous and ostentatious dress
remains inarticulate, inexpressive, silent. Thus the feeling of the loneliness of life in an in-
elegant world.
Interiority as the essence of elegance is not consciousness, the ego, or the content of
consciousness. These are abstract constructs whereas interiority is a concrete essence discoverable
through the phenomenological exegesis of life. Interiority is the very basis of human life; it is
pure expressivitity, it is talkative. It uses the world as its language universe in a constantly
creative and meaningful way. The world is for interiority; the world is not something "in-itse lf ."
Since the world is for interiority, it is only and insofar as it is or become a transparent media for
expressirg interiority. For elegance the world is a "means" where interiority is the self-sufficient
"end ." For in-elegance the world is "in-itself" and there is no goal, no end proper: the world is
a means toward no goal; means are its own goa I.
The organization of collective life is today believed to require the automatic execution of
a variety of movements and behaviors. O:-ganization requires ri gidity and "rnodernizc tion";
provisions, regulations, automation, discipline, etc. Individuals are required to automatize
their behavior and sacrifice their individuality and spontaneity. Only those behaviors defined by
the system of organization are important. These behaviors which define him in the organizational
Iife are his roles. He is then a pol iceman, a teacher, a manager, a worker, etc. His is a role,
a behavioral tag. Today social science practically knows only roles. Behind that role, tha-t-
coat, that dress, that armor, there is a big question mark. In section I of this essay I have given
two of the prevalent assumptions regarding the inside of this armor. The so-called interactions,
social relations involving rules, regulations, norms, standards, and prohibitions, are relations
and collisions between roles, coats, and armors. They are mechanical, automatic, and abstract.
This is, of course, how in-elegance ·'sees" itself in an in-elegant world. In-elegance is
cbs troc tiv er to deal with objects and exteriors it is forced to abstract.
II Ci e 10 que yo digo! Que no puee cer! Coche parriba, coche p'cbo]o l
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But this in not the only way of wearing cocts , Ortega, who already noticed the organi-
zation of life in Germany as early as 1850, gives for contrast an interesting example of a Sevillan
traffic policeman who confronted in the street with a traffic [ern does not rigidly display the
traffic ordinances but instead, in a most personal way, waves his arms in the air, his helmet
pushed to the side of his ear, and in a Hameltian monologue expresses himself saying:
Since a role is like an abstract coat, it is capable of being worn in a variety of ways. The
wearer of a role can accept it as prefabricated and submit his life to it, and be worn by his role-
coat. This situation is as if the coat were bought in a shop with a list of prescriptions about how
to wear it and where to wear it. Such a person surrenders to the instructions of how to display
this objec t . He is a manager, a doctor, a technician, a secretary, and nothing else. He is then
'professloncl" which means to be "responsib le " in following the instructions of the shop about how
to wear his role-coat. The coldness and JI impersonality" surrounding the [ob place and the office
is due to the fact that there is nobody there except coats. When this manikin takes his coat off
(stops erecting his role) he stands naked and does not know what to do; his life dims, he is bored,
his life is an empti~, a nothingness. Only a pure frigid ego remains. Deprived of the only
thirg there is - - the role-coat - - this ego drinks and drugs itself. In personal interaction, in
situations in intimacy~e is clumsy, turpid; he has to wear another coat, become the [oker, the
chatterer, the popular person. This pure ego must have a versatile wardrobe. He has to dress and
display. But each coat is prefabricated. The corporations draft the rules and prescriptions of how
to wear these role-coats (how to be a moncqer's wife, how to play golf with your boss, how to act
as a politician1s wife, etc.). Each role-coat becomes a straight [ccket, an armor. This is how
the ego "exists" in an in-el egant world.
Another example is provided by a M,~xican friend of mi ne who, on one occasion, whi Ie he
was a student, left his car parked momentarily in the faculty parking lot. When he returned he
found a university policeman very diligently drafting a ticket. My Mexican friend, in a very
personal way, addressed the policeman to tell him that he left his car there because he was to
pick up a book and run out in a few minutes. The policeman proceeded immutably, mechanically,
and like a pre-programmed automaton moved his lips to utter two words: .. Sorry, sir!" My
Mexican friend futilely continued to tell the policeman, in the most polite manner, that he was
acting like an automaton and that he was dealing with a human being, that the ticket would
amount to one-fifth of his month's graduate assistantship, and that as a person he should
emphathize with his situation. My Friend's words were being addressed not to a person, but only
to a policeman, a role a thing; and things do not interact, they are passive resistances. Like a
mountain, when spoken to, they reflect the echo of your voice, you hear yourself and yourself
alone.
These two examples serve again to illustrate what I have said in section II in relation to
elegance and in-elegance, mainly, that clothing does not determine. elegance or in-elegance.
Thus, that exteriority which for the in-elegant becomes everything, which is visible, hard,
l'lJ-ieaven forbid! This cori'f be, thatls all! Cars this way, cars that way! This ccn'f be, thor's
cl l l " (Ortega, 1951:195).
This leads to the phenomenological exegesis of another facet of life. In an in-elegant
world where the essence "emptiness" predominates, where all is exteriority, pure objectness, in
this world a rebellion must necessarily be a rebellion against objectness , This rebellion can take
two forms: one, the control of the i ncreasi ng compl ication of ob [ectness, i. e., the simpl ification
of the world; and two, a rejection of objectness. Let us examine the former first.
The integration of culture and society, the one-dimensional ity of contemporary man
pointed out by todoy 's critics of society is misleading. Instead, it would be more appropriate to
talk about complication, disintegration and disorientation, and the attempt at simplification.
This is what disturbs the critic and at the same time escapes him. He still sees only the surface,
an immense superficiality. The zest for simplification is also found among critics. They interpret
constraining, and which wears him -- this exterior becomes unnoticeable for the elegant. To the
elegant, objecrs , roles, the coats of life and their alleged "systern" are not "reified," and
IIde-a1 iencfion" is either already accomplished or it is a meaningless abstraction of the in-elegant.
AI ienation is for him simply a word, a concept with no reference to his manner of bei ng, i. e., his
life. For elegance, a de-alienation is then a negative concept of the dissatisfied in-elegant who
want to stop the in-elegance of their world but do not understand life. For the elegant, the
exterior is indispensable. If this exterior is destroyed, if he is divested of it, it would signify the
eradication of the media, language universe, through which he expresses his "interlori ty ." The
radical change of the system becomes in his eyes a monstruous as the radical elimination of all
language. Only to the dissatisfied in-elegant of an in-elegant world, who has not understood the
essence of elegance, who does not understand what "interiority" is, only to that individual would
such occurrences be possible.
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The abundance of superficiality, of objectness, represents an increase of possibilities and
choices above needs. This increase in the quantity and variety of exteriority gives the illusion of
an increase in external freedom which is actually an increase in complication. This situation calls
for simplification of the complicated externality. From the side of the in-elegant, simplification
is attempted by juridical and scientific legislation. In an in-elegant epoch, when the increase of
pure exteriority becomes overwhelming, everything seems out of control. The multiple empty
egos of the in-elegant find themselves without direction. It is then that the legislative body
becomes extremely active. Pure reason, the intellective tool of the in-elegant, is employed to
the utmost, not only politically but through science as well. What does this mean? Simply that
a "sc ientif ic" explanation of man becomes the best and only feasible way to approach the problem
of the complicated externality. For the in-elegant, all is externality, objectness; it can be
treated and explained as physics explains nature. Thus, the attempt to formulate principles and
laws which are pure, absolute, radical, pristine, (more geometrico, as Spinoza would say) in
order to "exploin'' man becomes the only manner which the in-elegant can conceive as the
solution to the complicated world of externality in which he lives. It is a most radical legislative
attempt. Scientific sociology, psychologism, massive behaviorism, economicism, structuralism,
technolgoism, scientism, systems analysis, and the computerization of society are only a few
names for the different attempts to simplification. That behaviorism flourishes in a complicated
in-elegant world is no enigma. W'nere all is exteriority, where emptiness is the essence which
predominates, only movements, going, coming, making things, enacting roles, stimulating and
responding, acting and reacting, reinforcing; in short, only 'behavior" is there. Man is
conceived as a thing in movement, in locomotion and transmutation, eating, dressing, colliding,
scatteri ng, etc. Man is a role player, a SIMSOCCER, a fashion model of his role-coats. M:>st
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a\l this externality as contradictory and what they propose as solution -- the elimination of ....•.•..J
contradictions -- is their name for simplification. In-elegant man begins to dream about the simple 1
the primitive culture, the return to nature. He wants a communal, homogeneous, undifferentiated' · 1·.·'
Iife, a life where everything is the same: no roles, no sex differences, no intellectual differences. .•
He wants a flat land because he is tired of the complex externality which his life is in an in-
elegant 'M:>rld. The quest for simpl ification has then two extreme forms: fascism and radica I
rejection of objectness. Both are responses to a complicated in-elegant world. Man becomes a
mixture of nostalgia and revolution, frenetic systematization end legislation end radical rejection
of the world.
Slovenliness is, therefore, a phenomenon that can only occur in an in-elegant world where
the insight into the actuality of interiority and interiority itself have either disappeared or have
never been present (in the phenomenological sense). It is, therefore, not an attempt to bring back
something which has been lost or to "create ll it. It only represents a rebellion lived in praxis by
some and theoretized as criticism among the intellectual critics. But in a world of in-elegance
neither one can grasp interiority. Thus, the rebellion can only articulate abstract notions.
II De-reification, J' .. de-al ienation, IJ "de-ideologization ll and •• de-mysfiflcction" are the most
common of these abstract concepts. When more specifically articulated, they come to represent
ideas such as "abolition of all roles" (feminists), "abolition of contradictions and dialectical over-
coming" (radical left), etc. It is then an abstract rebellion and an abstract critique of abstracted
exteriorities. It is abstract negation; it is the rebellion and criticism of the in-elegant against
themselves. It proposes divestment and nakedness as the solution to the problem of the complexity
in an in-elegant world. Words, empty abstract concepts are the only things that remain. If
examined closely theyare always negative and as all pure negation, they are empty. This is not
mysterious. The in-elegant in revolt against himself thinks that nothing can be lost by standing
naked for after all there is nothing to express, nothing to -talk about. Thus, feminism becomes
misanthropism, phi losophy becomes misososphy and thought becomes ni hi Iism.
The radical rejection of objectness in an in-elegant world is the rejection of the in-
e leqorit's dress which has come to be regarded as oppressive. It is not the rejection of in-elegance
but the rejection of objectness, of the clothing of the in-elegant. Since objectness and exteriority
is all there is in an in-elegant world, this rejection must necessarily mean a fall into that which
will remain if exteriority is rejected - - "emptiness. II This situation, in contrast with elegance and
in-elegance I will call II slovenliness. II The essence of slovenliness is .. untidiness" and its funda-
. mental condition is .. negativity" or II negativeness. II This fundamental condition of "untidiness, II
"reqcfivi ry, II has the peculiar characteristic of being an open-ended negation, i.e., the result of
the negation is open, indeterminate, unknown. The reason for this is simple. An in-elegant that
revolts against in-elegance becomes slovenly, i.e., does not care for his dress, he rejects it.
But the in-elegant without dress in nothing; it is a pure ego, an abstraction. His concrete life is
indeterminate, he lives suspended from a nowhere. Negativity in an in-elegant world can only be
the negativity of exteriority and superficiality; it is, in a sense, pure negativity.
The pure negativity of in-elegant revolt against in-elegance is nevertheless the first
incomplete insight of the in-elegant into in-elegance. It is the phenomenological insight or
perception of a "leek of. II But a perception of a "leek of, II as we already saw in Section II is a
negative perception. In thought, this becomes the idea of a "lock of something" which is missing,
and therefore unknown. This means to have thought the "unknown. II But to think the 'unknown"
is to think the "posslbi l iry of II; it is therefore the thought of "pure possibility. II "Pure possibi l ity''
Finally, slovenliness is the derangement of life. It is the indeterminate negation of in-
sanity. Indeterminacy means being nowhere. It is therefore only the pure possibility of return to
sanity, insanity or the permanence of derangement. It is paralysis.
is either everything or "nothingness" which is the opposite of something. This is the reason why·
Hegel said: "be inq is nothingness. at "Nothinqness, It "lack of, II and II pure possibi lity" are then
furdamental conditions of life in general and dangerously prevalent in an in-elegant world. This
will be better illustrated in the next section on the phenomenological exegesis of the tragic life
of the parvenu. Life without possibility is inconceivable. It is a necessary derangement. The
three fundamental facets of life are, then, elegance, in-elegance and slovenliness.
In-elegance, on the other hand, is a condition of in-sanity, i. e., "un-dound ." Life can-
not understand itself because the world is all exteriority and life is fundamentally interiority.
Interiority is precisely what in-elegance lacks and does not know it. Emptiness, the essence of
in-elegance is not intuited either. Life is u explai ned II but not understood. Incomprehensibi Iity,
lack of communication and meaninglessness are the consequence of the lack of expressiveness that
characterizes both in-elegance and insanity.
19Elegance, Sanity I and Alienation
The "mental ll condition of elegance is II sanity"; that of in-elegance is "in-scnity "; and
that of slovenliness is "dercnqernent . II Sanity also means It sound, II i.e., euphonic. It is the
condition of "meaning, II "com-prehension, II co-penetration, II and "clarity. II It is life under-
standing itself. There could not be a better definition of sanity. That fundamental facet of life
where love, friendship, the meaningful exchange of interiorities, expressiveness and the conver-
sion of the external world into a language universe was phenomenologically uncovered from
elegance. Sanity is the elegance of living. The return to sanity is the return to elegance.
Elegance is being oneself despite the dress. It is not being aware of the clothes; it is indifference
towards the clothes. It is not disdain, rebellion, or attempt to control the clothes. It is wearing
one's clothes so that one can act indifferently towards them. Elegance refuses both nakedness and
control. This is sanity.
Life always involves a complex set of choices, sympathies and antipathies, respect and
disdain, in an endless human drama. Life is a lived tragedy. Thus, to a certain degree life is
always a "double bind. II Contemporary man, the in-elegant man, the man who lacks interiority,
who is pure emptiness, also lacks an understanding of life and its fundamental condition. The
condition of this man is one of in-sanity, whether or not he breaks down into what is today cal led
"mento] illness. It The intellectual rationalism which serves as the intellectual tool of the in-
elegant world remains in its negation as slovenliness. Intellectual slovenliness is then rationalist
and uses rationalism as the basic tool of criticism. The intellectualization of derangement is
rationalist. Its concepts are as fantastic as those of the purely rational geometry, e.g., a point
(that which has no parts), a line (length without breadth), etc. These are purely fantasitc
conceptions which are only possible in thought. As mentioned above, the rationalism of intel-
lectualized derangement also operates with purely fantastic concepts such as de-alienation, de-
reification, de-ideologization, etc. without previous and careful analysis of these concepts. As
a consequence they have become mere words, meaningless abstractions. Nietzsche, Dilthey,
Bergson, Ortega y Gasset, and Heidegger have been tel ling us that intellectualism can only
attempt to "explo in " life and that it will therefore find it convenient to resort to rationalist
concepts. But life, they tell us, cannot be II explained"; it can only be understood. W'nen the
revolt against in-elegance does not reject the intellectual tool of in-elegance which is
IV
Single individuals, whole peoples, or epochs can be characterized by the predominance of
one or more of the three fundamental conditions of life. The industrialized West is characterized
by the predominance of insanity and derangement.
rationalism, the result is rationalist intellectualized derangement. Then, not different from the
in-elegant systematizers of the complexity of life in an in-elegant world (the quest for simplifi-
cation mentioned before), intellectualistic criticism will want concrete life to be molded by the
concepts of abstract reason.
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To illustrate the phenomenological exegesis of elegance, in-elegance, and slovenliness I
have chosen the phenomenon of the parvenu, or better, the tragic life of the parvenu. The
"nouvecu riche, " the .1 parvenu,lI the" snob,lI the "orrivist ;" the "social climber" is said to be
despised by both those with whom he used to belong and by those to whom he aspires to belong.
The parvenu himself denies his origins, i.e., he denies those with whom he belonged: his parents,
relatives, former friends, and ccqucintcnces , He is said to "aspire" to "enter ll another group.
In the rigid language of sociologists he has a "group of origin" and a IIgroup of reference" to which
he 'hspires" to lIenter." This phenomenon is as common as it is little understood. Many specula-
tions making allusion to hate, resentment, rejection, "life style,lI etc. have been attempted.
Max Weber1s study on status is sti II the best attempt but very dificient.
The parvenu (from French parvenir, to arrive; Latin pervenire) is a stranger everywhere.
He is a stranger to himself, to those he used to I' be-long-with,1I to those he thinks are his equals
(inter pares) in the lithe arriving! II i.e., to his co-parvenus, and to those he thinks should accept
him. (Those who in his estimation have" been-there-Iong ll . ) He is up-rooted, he has no roots
(without radix); he therefore has nothing to hold on to: no soi I from which to nourish his life. He
cannot go to the roots of origin which he has lost, he has not grown new roots to hold on to the
new soil of his destination, and he is presently rootless. He is therefore the least radical being
in existence. This, in passing! also indicates why he is easily politically seduced.
"To be-long with" is "to-be-with" somebody in a lasting manner. liTo-be wi th" is to
"co-exist. It The II C O " of co-exist indicates a mutuali.ty of exchange. Exchange of what? What
kind of exchange? Obviously the exchange of things can be observed to take place in life. But
the mere exchange of things does not imply co-existence for as we well know the exchange of
things can take place among totally unknown persons of different races, creeds, languages, etc.
Exchange of things can therefore take place among total strangers. All this despite the apparent
fact that exchange unites people. Stranger means Uta be-long outside of one's own." Stranger
connotes "out-side one's previous experience," "un-known, .. "un-fami liar .... It connotes extran-
eousness, externality! Foreiqness, difference. A stranger is an alien (from the Latin alienus, to
be-long to an-other) . --
If he is without anybody II tc -be-wi th ;" u to be-long-with,1I to "co-exist,1I it is because
he has nothing to exchange. Does he have to exchange something? Can the life to which he
aspires be possible without a particular kind of exchange? The parvenu leads a tragic life
because what he needs to exchange is something he does not have. What is this "sornethinq"?
2 1 should like to mention here something which I did not mention earlier and which I think might
throw further light on this exegesis. Objects made by man may be the conductors of the inter-
iority of their creator. For example, an artistic object. In industrial society this possibility is
almost absent. Manufactured ob [ecrs are III ifeless, II i. e. 1 inexpressive. This is also understood
if we keep in mind that industrial society is an in-elegant society.
I have already shown how objects become or are the language of elegance although
language itself does not say anything. These objects turned into a language are necessary and
indispensable, but they are ignored by the elegant; he is indifferent to them. Why? If he were
not, if the objects were to become the center of attention, the objects themselves, not the elegant
person would be present. I have also shown how love and friendship are examples of the supreme
manifestation of elegance. The elegant then is a person whose whole "external" world becomes a
language to communicate his "Inter'iori ty . II I have also said that the parvenu is in-elegant, that
is} he has no "Inter iority ." The fundamental characteristic of "interiority" is "expressiveness"
and the parvenu is expressionless because the media of expression is opaque; it is not transparent
as jon the elegant. This potential media is the world of his ostentatious display.
In the phenomenlogical exegesis of elegance we saw that its essence, "Interiority III was
precisely what was lacking in in-elegance without in-elegance intuiting it. The pavenu is not
elegant, he is in-eleganct. Those with whom he wants to .. be-long" assumedly are elegant and
have an .. interiority." Those to whom he used to be-long may have had an-other I~nteriorityll;
and those whom he finds in the same boat are, like him, without" interiority" of any kind.
Several questions arise here. First, why is the parvenu without an .. interiority" if assumedly he had
one when he used to be-long-with those with whom he no-longer be-longs? The answer must come
from the previous phenomenological exegesis of elegance and in-elegance. He is in-elegant
because his condition is one of display of newly acquired objects such as possessions and positions.
As I have mentioned before, this ostentation of pure exteriority of objects catches the attention of
others. Objects themselves do not express anything; they are dead, silent, mute. Objects, like
words themselves, if we concentrate on their sounds, are simple physical perceptions. These
objects were the in-elegant parvenu; they are not worn by him. The have no meaning in them-
selves and therefore do not express anything. 2
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The reader may be tempted to think that the parvenu has an "interlorlty" concealed by the
objects. This may be the case if "infer iority" is understood as consciousness or an ego. But
"interiori ty" is nothing like that. This is an important point since previous superficial accounts
of the phenomenon of the parvenu have not realized that the parvenu may desperately think that
what he lacks is .. style" (in the behavioristic sense). But the more he tries to acquire this style,
e.g., giving balls, parties, dressing fashionably, socializing with those he considers to be his
.. group of reference," studying manners and etiquette, sponsoring the arts, frequenting the opera,
visiting museums, and, in short, acquiring that "style of life" which externally seems to him a
requirement for "occeptonce, II the less he may succeed. External appearances may indicate a
success but they are on Iy appearances. The more he tries, the more he remains a parvenu. The
parvenu is always a parvenu. Parvenuism, if I may be allowed this neologism, is almost as
permanent a condition as being tailor short. Only the second generation may It make it. II The
phenomenon of the parvenu definitely refers to a crucial aspect of life. In the presence of this
refractoriness of the parvenu condition we have come to accept all kinds of meaningless explana-
tions about people, classes, human nature, etc. To say that the parvenu does not have the
"sty le of life" of those he aspires to be-long-with, that the latter refuse to .. cccept" him because
In the paritcular case of the life of the parvenu, then, the fundamental exchange of
interiorities is lacking because there is no "interlorlty.." This, in general, means also that he is
a stranger to himself. How can one be a stranger to one-self? By being extraneous, external,
foreign, alien to one-self. Notice that if alienmeans lito be-long to cn-other j " alien to one-
self then means lito be-long to an-other self." How can one 'be-long to an-other self"? What is
this other self? This other self can be an-other person or object. And is not this precisely what
he is not "one of them, It that he has" no tradition,1I "linecqe, It that he "shows his origin, II that
his presence is "ernborrossinq" because "awkward,1I "crnonnered , It -- this, all of this, is a question
long begging. It is a description of a phenomenon of life by the appearances. No more revealing
is the account in terms of the evilness of man, of snoboism , of selfishness, of exclusivity, of
interests. The empirical sociologist, armed with statistics, matrices, Markov chains, mobility
studies, probabilities of entering and leaving "social strata, II of income distributions and so forth
says even less. Sociologists have long forgotten Iife itself and, as a consequence, vital phenomena
remains largely un-understood. The parvenu, then, does have an "interiority, It he is expression-
less, he is therefore silent; he is only objec tness, exteriority, pure superficiality.
To 'be-lonq" means, again, to 'be-long-with, II to "co-exist, II to exchange "interiorities."
This implies to ''oe-in-a-dia-Iogue.'' To be accepted is to be tire-cognized." 'Re-coqnition" is
to know again, to perceive to be identical with "something" previously "unknown," i. e., the
perception of something as existing or ture {notice that the Latin cognitio means "a getting to
know". It is this "knowing, I' this "perceiving" of "something" which demands the existence of
"interiori ty ." Re-cognition is, then, the mutual cognition of "interiority" wh·ere cognition is
pheromenological perception. (We live phenomenologically.) It is only when "i nter iori ty" exists,
as in elegance, that it can be re-cognized, perceived. It is only by understanding that life is
fundamentally based on the exchange of interiorities that we can escape from the darkness of
irtellectualist "knowing. II This "knowinq" itself has to be understood from within life itself. It
would be difficult to account for our life if we do not understand that the lIexternal" wor ld has the
possibility of being a transparent media through which interiorities are transmitted and communi-
cated. This, in passing, indicates the precariousness of a life pervaded by in-elegance and
parvenuism. The IIloneliness,1I the "soli tude ;" the "abandonment," the "nausea" that existen-
tialists talk about is only a small indication of in-elegant life. Where objects alone or predom-
inantly unite man, there is no communication. Recent attempts to concentrate on the condition
of "distorted comrnunicofion " among contemporary man (e. g., Habermas) and the attempt to
formulate a theory that would allow the development of "undisrorted comrnunicctlon" lack the
fundamental phenomenological insight into elegance as a fundamental condition of sane life.
These approaches are sti II caught up in the notion of conscious self-reflection and ignore the
condition of in-elegance which may intrinsically impede the possibility of that self-reflection.
Habermas's distinction between work and interaction is a step in the right direction if the inter-
action is understood phenomenologically as the possibility of exchange of "interiorities." Other-
wise, these theories have to be either radically modi fied or abandoned. Superficial i ty,
exteriority, and objectness as the essential characteristic of in-elegance and parvenuism, entails
either the lack of "i nter iority " or its phenomenological concealment. It is the interference
(the distortion) of communication by the objects becoming or being opaque, by the objects not
being part of the language used in the communication or exchange of interiorities that charac-
terize in-elegance. This is also an extremely important point for linguistics. The phenomeno-
logical exegesis of elegance, and in-elegance is, I think, crucial for the understanding, not
the explanation, of life in the most general sense.
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vThe resemblance of life in the affJuenct society today and that of the parvenu is no
coincidence. Modern life as a whole is a life in which everybody is a parvenu. This is the
topic of the next section.
The exact phenomenological exegesis of the structure of "interiority, It as mentioned before,
does not pertain here and I must beg my readers to excuse me for this imcompleteness. For the
present essay only, the exegesis of the essences of elegance, inelegance and slovenliness as such
are requi red.
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"[n-e leqcnce" is? It is other persons, objects, roles, clothes, which wear the in-elegant person.
He be-longs to them, he is worn by them. He IS these objects, he is nothing but this exteriority I
he is therefore empty. "Emptiness" is the essence of in-elegance and objectness its fundamental
characteristic. ---=rhein-elegant is therefore a role or set of roles, he is the clothes that wear him,
he is not, sensu stricto, even alienated; he is like a thing. The subject then is reduced to an
abstract ego. But this ego, this consciousness is an abstraction. It is possible to say then that a
world of parvenus is a collectivity of things and has therefore the same character as nature which
can therefore be dealt with, explained, and controlled in the same way as physics deals with
matter. This is precisely the way in which the theorists of the in-elegant world try to apprehend
life! It was an American conservative who indicted America when he said: "Americcns are
nouveau riche wanting to become aristocrats." The name of this American is George Homans.
The emptiness, the lack of interiority of the parvenu leaves him alone in the world. In
this sense, we are all lonely to a greater or lesser degree; we are all parvenues. The phenomenon
of loreliness, which has been so thoroughly treated by existentialist philosophies, has been
popularized by Sortres phrase "we are alone. II Ortega y Gosset, even before Heideqqer , exposed
the fundamental condition of life to be a "rodiccl solitude. II In the present example, loneliness
is clearly the condition of the parvenu who is a stranger to himself, to those he used to 'be-Jcnq-
with, It to those he considers in the same station, his inter pares or co-parvenus, and to those he
aspires to Itbe-long-with." This is not only a condition of loneliness, but a tragedy also. "Lo vida
tiene un sentido trcqico" as Unamuno has well understood.
The condition of the parvenu is the paradigm of life itself: the ideal type for the phenom-
enological exegesis of life. Could we not say that life is nothing but arriving, a coming-from
which ro longer is, to which we cannot return; a going-toward which is not yet, and which we
wil I never reach because we are denied access to or recognition by it? The parvenu is the
objec t ivo tion of life itself. To understand life requires to "see ll phenomenologically through the
forms of objectivized life. As I mentioned before, we live phenomenologically but interpret it
intelJectualistically. Intellectuality is itself a mode of life, it is an activity which pertains to
life. To pretend to tailor concrete life by the patterns of the rationalist concepts of the intellect
is a thing of the past, mainly of the dark ages of rationalist positivism.
Youth is not only a condition of the body but a vital attitude. As a biological condition
youth does not necessari Iy coincide with a youthful attitude. There are people who are born old
and old people who exhibit a young mentality. Of the various symptoms of youth I think the
following to be most characteristic: primitivism, sense of prepotency and superiority, vigor,
belief that it can solve the problems of the world, petulance, copric iousness, ostentation,
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emptiness and superficiality, indiscretion, frivolity, flightiness, avidity to socialize and gather,
external exuberance, activity for its own sake, insatiability, consumptiveness, easy persuasion,
simplistic, idealistic, fickle, playful, experimentative, ovid for novelty, restlessness. Youth
is naive, candid and innocent; it becomes easi Iy tired of things; it is faddish. Youth is usually
persuaded by appearances; bright colors and flamboyant designs attrac.t the young easi Iy. Youth
in general is a condition of not being yet. The whole world is ahead.
All the characteristics of the parvenu and the young belong as wei I to our present epoch as
a whole. But the American people are the prototype of the youthful parvenu.
This essential characteristic of American culture serves to clarify many misunderstandings.
For example, it is usually accepted that America is the most rapidly changing society in the West.
I think this is an illusion based on superficial observation. Youth is faddish, it likes to pursue
temporary and ephemeral stimulants. It is easi Iy excitable and wants constantly renewable
stimulation. We are accustomed to hear what the college girl wants: .. meet new people, visit
new places, have new experiences," in other words, to II have fun. II The rapid alternation of fads
brouqht about by a youthful people should not be confused with change and much less with
historical change. Industry produces to satisfy fads. This is the reason why American products are
notoriously short-I ived. Everything is bui It to last for as long as the fad. All lndustria! products
bear this mark of youthful demand. Arnerico is pervaded by youthful banality creating an atmos-
phere of ephemeral superficialities, shullow and without depth which are expressionless; they come
and go without leaving any long-lasting imprint. Other common traits of Americans, such as their
concern with mobility, consumption, socializing, having parties, being accepted, being liked,
and being popular are also symptoms of their youthful and in-elegant world view.
Whole epochs can be young. Ours is definitely a young epoch, an epoch of youthful
parevenus, an epoch without roots and without soi I. The unrest and uneasiness of today are the
best manifestations of this condition. As a consequence, our epoch is one of crisis, a turning
poi nt, a stage of ambiguity and tension, of suspense, when the future is least sure. Europe has
been going through this stage for the last century. The so-called "Americonizction of Europe" is
imprecise; it should be called the rejuvenation of Europe which includes her receptivity to the
influences of the youthful America. Europe is then becoming a continent of youthful parvenus.
But parvenu Europe has a "group of reference ll : its history. History is the memory and tradition
of a whole people and it becomes present in philosophy. This is why the crisis of the West was
first noticed by European phi losophy.
Pathology defines a crisis as a moment in a disease at which a decisive change must occur
either in the direction of recovery or death. In Greek, Krisis had the commotation of decision.
Crises are, then, moments when something must be done.---rnsection III I have interpreted this
urge to do something as the urge to simplify and control the world on the one hand and a revolt
against the complication and emptiness on the other. This represents an inordinate emphasis on
social engineering, on "low and order" and social welfare at one extreme and an attack on
everything as supporting the status quo at the other extreme. But this attack on the status quo is
not because the status quo is an orderly and secure state. On the contrary, the opposite is the
case. It is an irony that the" defenders" of the status quo are perceived as the advocates of
"law and order" by their opponents and critics. The latter are not less concerned with law and
order; it is the status quo in revolt against itself. The status quo of a youthful epoch is restless,




Thus, the old are confined in homes for the aged. The feelings of rejection and inutility
on the part of our elders, their loneliness and feeling of inadequacy are not at all mysterious.
These are the signs of the tragedy of senescent life in an epoch of youthful parvenus. The parvenu
always denies his "old folks.·1 Surfaces and exteriors provide the basis for his theory of valuation.
Societies of youthful parvenus are therefore geronticidal .
want to be 'bccepted.." "re-cognized." But when a whole people is parvenu it has nobody that
can "occept" and "re-scoqni ze " them. This, then, represents a period of history which is a
universal tragedy. This is why it is an epoch of crisis, a dreadful crisis. Continental philosophy
has been saying precisely this for the last century. As the voice of the wise elder, contemporary
philosophy is a reflection on the mistakes of its own youth which addresses the reticent youth of
today·s period of history I a period of unparalleled rejuvencfion, a juveni Ie and misosophic
period sure of itslef in its insecurity, deaf, arrogant and tremerous, a young parvenu who refuses
to look back and wants only to look forward into nothingness.
Wnat could old age offer? Nothing, nothing at cl l , This is the tragic truth of our age.
The apparent concern for the condition of the old is hypocritical. Bodi Iy care, proper confine-
ment, luxurious settings in their homes, welfare dedication and social security improvements are
all ineffective and useless and futile. The sanity of life is elegance. All those attempts are in-
elegant. The physiologically senescent do not have anything to offer in youthful epochs of
parvenus. The old are empty and therefore expressionless. They rarely have anything to commun-
icate and contribute, and when they do, it can not be received by their chronologically younger
contemporaries. The latter, which are in-elegant youthful parvenus do not and cannot see any-
thing but surfaces and exteriors. The old must therefore be necessari fy perceived as empty,
deterioriated containers, and as such, they are disposed of.
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In an epoch of youthful parvenus, the physiologically old become a burden of incomparable
mcqni rude , This is because old age is the denial of youth, of vitality, of vigor; but above 01 f, it
is ugly. The physiologically old are bound to be very ugly in a youthful age of in-elegant
parvenus. The essence of in-elegance is superficiality I exteriority, and the most "visible" in the
physiologically old is the external deterioration of their once exuberant surface. But the old in a
youthful age are also young, i.e. 1 in-elegant, empty. The conflict between the ages so
characteristic in America is a confl ict between exteriors, for everything is exteriority, super-
ficiality; the physiological surface of the body is another surfcce , an inexorable coat. The so-
called IIgeneration gaps, II the obsessive concern with age, the drastic "cqe gradings" of Americans
(e.gel the ·'pre-teenager,1I the IIteenager,lI the "dori'f trust anybody over thirty" and the "over
the hi IP' categories, the obsessive display of sex and youthful bodies, the body ostentation) are
inevitable manifestations of the concern with surfaces, exteriors, thi ngs.
Biological death in such an epoch becomes the ugliest sight; it is the most offensive
happening that can occur in a youthful age of parvenus; it is utterly repulsive and threatening.
Death is not a sad event of life when the final departure of a loved one, the definite break
between interiorities becomes an occasion for a meditation on life; death is a repugnant relief,
an unloading of a heavy and ugly burden. Death must therefore be concealed. The body must
be processed through the funeral home, put out of sight there; its exterior must be covered with
make-up, its blood drained and replaced with a preserving liquid substance; it must be made to
look as much alive as possible. (Exteriors are very important for the young and the in-elegant.
It is interesting to observe that funeral homes in America are often the most sumptuous in their
towns.) It follows, then, that outer manifestations of grief must be repressed; reminders of the
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deceased such as mourning clothes, wakes, etc., must be absent; they are the reminders of the
ugliest event. Burials are smooth and circumspect; a smooth ride from the funeral home to the
cemetery where only a small stone wi II mark the location of the body. Death, in general, must
be put out of one1s mind. Death is not life; death, on the contrary, is profundity; it is transcen-
dental, philosophical, and mysterious. Life, the life of the youthful parvenu, is on the contrary,
all externality, superficiality, factuality, and ostenta.tion; life is "showing off: and it is to "show
off ."
The meaning of death, its ontological presence, is as absent in youth that the latter is
prone, as a consequence, to be temerious, daring and violent. Youth lives life as a constant
risk of death; it is almost fearless. The American is violent, bodily aggressive, and ready to "pick
a fight. II For the youthful American, this is one more "excitement. II Violence is for them an
integral part of life; if absent, if not constantly represented on the screen, in literature, on T. V.
the American gets bored - - non-violence is death itself, violence if life. It is interesting to see
that there is almost no "Western" motion picture which does not have a fight portrayed as excite-
ment and enjoyment for its own sake, a IIfree for all." Americans say: "violence is as American
as apple pie"; they do not even understand the reasons for this. This provides in my estimation
another insight into the dreadful condition of cultures of youthful parvenus, of in-elegant peoples.
"Violence is as American as apple pie" is imprecise; it should say: in-elegance is as American
as youthful parvenuism, as primitivism, as emptiness. In this type of violence there is no risking
of Iife for -great causes." Whoever does not understand this does not understand American life.
America is the most unheroic nation in history and our epoch is, in general, the least heroic epoch.
Epochs of crisis and unrest like ours are cowardly, dull, and boring. Nevertheless, they are
epochs of lively self-anihilation. They are nihilist through and through. The gluttony of in-
elegant life is threatened with death by starvation from lack of an elegance it does not know.
World history wi II not record in the Future our epoch as heroic.
To be young is not to be yet .•• America is not yet. The American is not yet.
He has not begun his history yet. He Iives his own prehistory. And in prehistory
there are no protagonists, no particular destiny; only pure circumstance
prevai Is. . . . America is the name of a si tuation, of a stage. . • • The
American cannot be defined for the simple reason that he is not yet.
(Ortega, 1932:378).
Americans have waited in vain for the" Great American Novelli without realizing that a
"Great °Novel" requires a .. Great Protcqonist" and where there is no history there is no protagonist.
VI
The twentieth century has been a century of transition and crisis. A whole century has
been spent on a battle between physiccl reason and vital reason, between the real ization of pure
reason and its overcoming. History will record it as one of the greatest transitional points in
mori's own humanization, provided that he survives it. The past fifty years have witnessed the
crisis from all sides and thinking men have become conscious of their destiny. The crisis of
Marxism is more than [ust a crisis within this particular doctrine; it is the last cry of the histor-
ical crisis of the West. The inheritance of the West has to be saved from its dangerous course.
Oswald Spengler, in 1926, saw in it the "decl ine" (or bettOer the decadence) of the West. Before
To declare a grandiose project of man Utopic is difficult. Some realizable projects are
Utopic if believed to be accomplished in an unrealizable span of time. But there are other
projects which are unrealizable even in infinite time. I say this because unless we understand
that man can cease to exist as human, or cease altogether, such projects are, if not Utopic,
An essential characteristic of human life is doing, activity, creativity, and this always
requires a resistance, an obstacle to overcome, something alien to man. The result of this essential
vitality of life does not have to be [udqed as progress, improvement, or the progressive perfec-
tibi lity of man. Happiness is not the goal of man as positivist progressivism has upheld. The ideal
of a future eternal bliss and the belief of its being the state of happiness is tantamount to wanting
life to cease as human life: it is an animalistic go~ It is for this reason that certain contem-
porary interpretations of the idea of de-alienation of man are barbaric. It is the barbarism of
contemporaryvulgar rebellion and criticism. If man did not intuit or feel a strangeness, an
alienation in his life, he would not, sensu stricto, act; in fact, he would no even think, philoso-
phize, love, desire, overcome, in short, exist. Only animals are unaware of their uncertainty;
morr's life is fundamentally uncertain.
Contemporary revolutionary spirit is contaminated by the rationalism of a mad Apollo. It
posits something pure, uncontaminated, virtually perfect such as the rationally perfect point and
line of geometry. Ortega y Gasset has bri Iliantly exposed this tendency of Western rationalism
in his EI Gcaso de las Revoluciones. Certain modern revolutionism resembles a geometrician who
wanted to realize the perfect point, that which has no parts. To any objection of Utopia this
revolutionism would respond that nothing is impossible for man. Does this include also the possi-
bility for man to become inhuman? Does the realization of this pure concept guiding the
revolutionary entail the dehumanization of man? The radical revolutionary no less than his
opponent - - the radical systematizer of todcy's compl icated life - - has not examined this care-
fully. Both want to subject life to an abstraction; both may very well be oriented toward the
dehumanization of man. The reason is that both are caught up in the rationalist madness of
toady's Apollo.
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him, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Unamuno led a philosophical revolt against what they thought
was at the center of the problem: the cult of rationalism and scientism. Their philosophies
leaned towards irrationalism and provided the basis for contemporary philosophy. They were the
great doubters who shouted: liThe old edifice is crumbling, look to life!" They took a good look
at the youthful and beautiful Apollo, the god of light and reason who illuminated the world sunk
in darkness, who purified this world of every obscrue and irrational element, who victorisouly
rescued order from chaos, and saw that Appllo, the god of measure and harmony had gone too far:
he now wanted to rationalize all reality including life. The Apollonian rejuvenation of toady
is a threat to life itself; Apollo has gone mad, insane. Protcqorcs' man as lithe measure of all
thi ngs" succumbed to a mad Appllo who now rules merci lesly. Man needs to examine himself as
Heraclitus, III have examined myse lf ." Socrates, the father 0 f Western thought, has been for-
gotten. His dictum: itA life which does not reflect on itself is not worth [Ivinq" has almost
become a reality. Life was handed to Apollo unconditionally to be dictated from above. But
the reality of life is not a known thing, i.e., it is not to be "explc i ned" intellectually or
rationa Ily through the Apollonian reve lo t ionj Iife is experienced and understood ontologica Ily.
Maine de Biron, W. Dilthey, M. Sheler, N. Hartmann, Bergson, Ortega y Gosset, Heidegger,
and others knew this very well. The reality of life ponders ontologically; it is the "radical
reality, II as Ortega y Gasset says, from which everything springs.





utterly inconceivable. Certain contemporary interpretations of de-alienation, de-reification,
de-ideologization have either lost all meaning or are extravagances of slovenly theories which
do not comprehend man. To enjoy freedom one must possess a tremendous amount of wisdom and
self-knowledge of life. There is no greater slavery than the pursuit of freedom for freedomls sake.
Among the young, freedom is like a loaded pistol in the hands of a chi Id. As Cervantes would
say: "Freedom is easier to achieve than to enjoy ...
The contempt for authority among the American youth in search of freedom stems from the
lack of respectable authorities in an epoch of youthful parvenus. Without, as sociologists would
say, lie group of reference" youth is right, but confuses his disrespect for authorities who lack
authority with the contempt for authority itself. The tragic condition of our elders examined in
the previous section is the best indication. The educators must themselves be educated, as Marx
said. Yet, unless these youthful parvenus mature into wisdom and elegance the present epoch is
doomed to the barbarism of authorityless equality. Youth rejects direction because it finds no
authoritative direction. Can it direct itself? Well, today the masses rule through their elected
leaders and yet they find themselves directionless.
Whence the lack of respect for authority, even among supposed equals? Respect also
connotes esteem, deference and discrimination regarding a person's superiority. It also connotes
admiration, approbation and veneration. All that these aspects connote is demanded by authority
today without having the basis for inspiring it in those who are to be respectful. Authority today
is like the ostentatious in-elegant who demands submission to his display of clothes and objects
which he assumedly has in larger quantity. But the in-elegant does not have anything to say, he
only has his display of clothes, objects, books, etc.; each of them are silent, mute, although
very visible. It is the number of clothes and objects wearing him, the number of books published,
and in general the external quantity which in an in-elegant world gives the in-elegant the power
to impose themselves on others. On this basis he gets access to positions of administrative mani-
pulation and demands a respect which is reluctantly granted by the in-elegant subordinates and
never recognized by the elegant. For the in-elegant subordinate, this reluctance is manifested
as jealousy in the sense of wishing to be as in-elegant as the in-elegant superior, i.e., a desire
to have as many objects of display as the superior. For the elegant the lack of respect is literally
one of disgust. A loathing accompanying the strong imposition of in-elegance on him by this
type of authority. It is like that nauseating and repugnant feeling we have when somebody forces
on us an overdone external manifestation which we cannot avoid. Structural authority as I would
like to call it, is not authority sensu stricto. It is the basis of a "pecking order" in an in-elegant
world where quantity and display dominate. It is for this reason that all authroity has come to be
regarded as "oppressive" and thus to be rejec ted. Where authority proper does not exist, that
which passes for authority (structural authority) lacks respect. It can only maintain itself by
emphasizing further the very aspect accounting for its lack of respect - - this is in-elegance.
Under these circumstances society becomes an amorphous entity in which single indivi-
dqo ls are lost in an aimless and constantly precarious environment. The company of society
meets with the most radical sol itude of the individual. This has already been shown in the
analysis of life in an in-elegant world of youthful parvenus. Boredom looms large. I think it
was Benedetto Croce who said that boredom is the situation in which our solitude is taken away
without giving us company in return. It is then that aimless masses and groups strive for
"meaning," for simplification of C noisy world robbing our solitude without giving company in
return. But si nce collectives never thi nk, their movement is thoughtless, lacki ng phi losophy,
Concluding Summary
This is the condition of a youthful, in-elegant and parvenu life on the verge of
sloven Iiness.
The attempt to account for the new situation, to give it meaning, stimulates thought and
action. One of these stimulations manifests itself as an attempt to control the situation.
(Meaninglessness always appears as a complication, i.e., a situation not tied together by a
convincing iustification.) This control aims at a simplification borrowing on the conceptual and
applied knowledge contained within the predominant world view. This response is bound to fail,
although it may be able to preserve the situation for quite a long time. The reason is that it
maintains the lack of meaning of the very world view which it attempts to use. This attempt,
29Elegance, Sanity, and AI ienation
I have presented three fundamental aspects of life in the form of three metaphors: elegance,
in-elegance and slovenliness. As fundamental aspects of life they represent the basic ground
elements nourishing our more general attitudes toward life. They are, in a sense, the ground
foundations for whole philosophies. They should not be confused with any characteristics of a
fixed human nature al though they represent a condition of existence as permanent as human exis-
tence itself. A fundamental condition of Iife is the ground of phi losophy but not phi losophy
itself. It only establishes the general aspect of the phi losophy and the variations within it but not
the specific character of the philosophy or its variants. For example, in-elegance is the funda-
menta I ground of natura Iism, materia Iism, positivism, rationa Iism (not reason), sc ientism,
behaviorism, sociologism, technologism, and other related "isrns , II Their essence is the same as
that of in-elegance, mainly, the emphasis on the external world (externality, superficiality, and
objec rness) as the only or most important reality. Spiritual life, interiority, or fundamental
interior life experiences are considered either as epiphenomena dependent on the primary reality
or simply not decisive. As in in-elegance, externality wears us.
and without a comprehension of life and reality. The latter has become a dead fact, a social
fact, as the great social positivist Durkheim triumphantly announced. Social and cultural
criticism becomes the dominant literary genre from the most obtruse and abstract to the most
popular and readi Iy consummable. The masses glut themselves on self-criticism. This has become
a favority pasttime of popular culture today. Aimless and amorphous like a fluid without a
container, which sees no limits, no perspectives, it looks in vain for the walls of the container;
it desperately looks for God. So fluid is this amorphous mass that its directionlessness ceases only
momentarily when like a liquid it is channeled by fads and sporadic leaders. But soon it tends to
spillover again.
Phi losophic variations united by a genera I attitude toward Iife constitute an integrated
world view. When the predominant world-view persists in a particular cultural and historical
condition, e.g./ the youthfulness of the present epoch as its essential characteristic, the predom-
inant world-view may no longer fit the prevalent human situation, i. e., it may no longer account
for the new experiences of life. It is then thJt life comes to experience this lack of account for
the new experiences as a problem. A life experience, it should be noticed, becomes a problem
only when it is not justified or accounted for meaningfully. II Meaninglessness, II then, is a life
experience revealing that the new life conditions are not accounted for, i.e., they do not
"rncke sense ." This is an important point not fully recognized today .. A crisis is always a break-
down of meaning.
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then, does not properly represent a philosophical renovation, an overcoming of the failure of the
predominant world view to provide meaning for life. In our epoch this orientation is grounded in
in-e leqcnce ,
The other search for meaning involves a variety of orientations all characterized byan
indeterminate negation of the new conditions of life. These orientations may range from a desire
to overthrow the whole "system" to a retreat from the "system. II They encompass both practically
lived orientations as well as theoretical criticism. The unlimited freedom of the individual or
his emancipation in a future world becomes the dominant idea. Exotic and mystical world views
internally developed or imported from exotic cultures become very attractive either as substitutes
for the lack of meaning within the prevalent world view or as a justification for its rejection.
These extraneous world views, as ideas, are only temporary hopes which cannot succeed for they
represent a drastic break with the historical dependency of man on his culture. They are a break
with history {although the attempt is made to see some of them as a "historiccl necessity'L They
represent, in other words, a demand on culture similar to the demand on man to become amnesic
and sti II be able to wal k around his historically conditioned environment. This orientation tends
to lack an understanding of man and his human condition. The reason is because it tends to
ignore the inexorability of historical continuity; and a break with historical continuity is like
amnesia. It ignores the fact that we think with our past as our memory. In our epoch this mode
of search for meaning is grounded on an emphasis on the fundamental condition of life which I
have called slovenliness.
Finally, a third orientation is represented by a serious philosophical criticism of the past
and the formulation of a new phi losophy (a new world view) which wi II both overcome the present
conditions and preserve the historical continuity indispensable for the preservation of man as a
human being. It is an attempt to understand life and its fundamental condition. Usually, its
beginnings are an unsystematic attempt to understand life from within. It is also an attempt to
comprehend the other possible orientations for a search for meaning as well as their plausibility or
unplausibility. It then represents an attempt to reform life, provide meaning within the inexor-
ability of historical continuity, and to overcome the predominant world view, or its indeterminate
negation, which no longer accounts for the new life experiences. In our epoch this orientation
is grounded on the fundamental condition of life which I have celled elegance.
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